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A Short History of the Right To Petition
Government for the Redress of
Grievances
Stephen A. Higginson
"Never Was a Right So Much Mystified and Magnified"
-John C. Calhoun (Senate, 1840)
In colonial America, the right of citizens to petition their assemblies
was an affirmative, remedial right which required governmental hearing
and response. Because each petition commanded legislative considera-
tion, citizens, in large part, controlled legislative agendas. This original
theory and practice of petitioning foundered when abolitionists flooded
Congress with petitions during the debates over slavery. As a result, the
right of petition was collapsed into the right of free speech and expres-
sion-a definitional narrowing which persists to this day.
I. INTRODUCTION
The original design of the First Amendment petition clause--stem -
ming from the right to petition local assemblies in colonial America, and
1. "Congress shall make no law ... abridging ... the right of the people ... to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. Amend. I. Because little discussion accompa-
nied the adoption of the petition clause, the Framers' intent is unclear. See infra text accompanying
notes 92-99. Blackstone and Story pass over the clause with brief comment, though Story's remark
deserves citation:
[The right of petition] would seem unnecessary to be expressly provided for in a republican
government, since . . . [i]t is impossible that it could be practically denied until the spirit of
liberty had wholly disappeared, and the people had become so servile and debased as to be
unfit to exercise any of the privileges of freemen.
2 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 645 (5th ed. 1891)
(footnote omitted); see also 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 143 (rev. ed. 1978) (petitioning to
King); 4 id. at 147 (tumultous petitioning); cf. C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CON-
STITUTIONAL LAw 40 (1969) ("the petitioning of a legislative body would seem to be an inherent
part of its relation with its constituency").
Little has been written on the history and politics of petitioning. Three broad historical surveys are:
D. SMITH, THE RIGHT TO PErrrION FOR REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES: CONSTITUTIONAL DEvELoP-
MENT AND INTERPRETATIONS (1971) (unpublished dissertation); Leys, Petitioning in the Nineteenth
and Twentieth Centuries, 3 Pox. STUD. 45-64 (1955); Nicholls, Surrogate for Democracy: Nine-
teenth Century British Petitioning, MD. HISTORIAN 43-52 (1974).
Two English pamphleteers addressed Parliament on the right of petition. See Letter from an Eng-
lish Subject to Parliament, The Right of British Subjects, To Petition and Apply to their Representa-
tives, Asserted and Vindicated (1733) (available in Library of Congress); Letter from John Somers to
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forgotten today 2-included a governmental duty to consider petitioners'
grievances. Transported to the national level, however, responsiveness to
individual petitions proved problematic. In its early years, Congress at-
tempted to pass favorably or unfavorably on every petition,' but proce-
dural strains soon emerged. Although sheer volume of business eventually
might have severed the duty of assembly consideration from First Amend-
ment petitioning,4 this result was guaranteed when petitioning became en-
meshed in the slavery controversy.
Antebellum Congresses were hostile to abolitionists' prayers and re-
fused to respect petitioners' right to legislative hearing. Members insisted
that Congress' competence jurisdictionally did not, and administratively
could not, extend to petitions for emancipation.5 Instead they adopted a
Parliament, Jura Populi Anglicani: or The Subject's Right of Petitioning Set Forth. Occasioned by
the Case of the Kentish Petitioners (London 1701) (available in Library of Congress); cf. English
Satirist's Anonymous Petition, The Petition of the Sharks of Africa to the British Parliament (circa
1790) ("prey[ing]" that "the Lords Spiritual and Temporal of Great Britain" protect the slave trade,
which supplied petitioners with their "moft favorite food-human flefh") (available in Library of
Congress).
2. The short line of Supreme Court cases that raise the petition clause, culminating in McDonald
v. Smith, 105 S. Ct. 2787, 2793 (1985) (petition right subsumed in guarantee of free expression)
(Brennan, J., concurring), consistently err in their interpretation of the petition clause as merely a
free expression guarantee. See generally Annotation, The Supreme Court and the First Amendment
Right To Petition the Government for a Redress of Grievances, 30 L. Ed. 2d 914-25 (survey of case
law). These cases reveal an unstudied treatment of colonial legal history by ignoring the original
meaning of the right, and especially its remedial, legislative character. But see Adderley v. Florida,
385 U.S. 39, 49 n.2 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (tracing history of right to petition).
The complete rejection of the colonial understanding of petitioning is best seen in a recent case
expressly denying that any duty of consideration arises from the petition clause. In late 1976, Truman
Chase of San Diego, California petitioned Senators Kennedy, Stevenson, and Cranston for assistance
with a Social Security claim. Receiving no reply, Chase brought suit protesting abridgment of his
First Amendment right to petition. The district court held that:
The plaintiff has confused his right to petition with a supposed right to have his petition
granted or acted upon in a certain way. But no such right is found in the Constitution ...
What a Senator does with petitions is absolutely within his discretion and is not a proper
subject of judicial inquiry, even if it might appear that he be grossly abusing that discretion.
Chase v. Kennedy, No. 77-305-T, mem. op. at 2 (S.D. Cal. July 11, 1977), affd, 605 F.2d 561, cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 935 (1979); see also Minnesota State Bd. Community Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S.
217, 284 (1984) ("To recognize a constitutional right to participate directly in government policymak-
ing would work a revolution in existing government practices.").
3. 4 A. HINDS, PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 3361 (1907).
4. One point of controversy over the Bill of Rights was the Federalist caution against unalterable
"liberties" like jury trial or petitioning, with their insistence that future developments could well make
change or even abandonment of such processes desirable. "For God's sake, Gentlemen," one Federal-
ist retorted to early cries for a Bill of Rights, "do not shut the door against improvement." America,
N.Y. Daily Advertiser, Dec. 31, 1787, reprinted in 15 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATI-
FICATION OF THE CoNswrrtrON 197 (J. Kaminski & G. Saladino eds. 1984).
5. See infra text accompanying notes 130-32. The Confederate States' Provisional Constitution
made this interpretation unequivocal with a deft addendum to the First Amendment: "[Congress shall
make no law abridging the right of the people] to petition the Government for a redress of such
petitions as the delegated powers of this Government may warrant it to consider and redress." PRO-
VISIONAL CONSTITUTION FOR THE CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA art. I, § 7, ci. 9, reprinted
in STATUTES AT LARGE OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES OF
AMERICA (J. Matthews ed. 1864) (emphasis added).
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series of anti-slavery "gag rules" that effectively abolished the right of
petition.
II. PETITIONING IN COLONIAL AMERICA
The first recorded act of business in the colony of Connecticut con-
cerned a grievance that one Henry Stiles had "traded a peece [firearm]
with the Indians for Corne." The magistrates who formed the colony's
first assembly admonished Stiles, and ordered him to regain the instru-
ment ("in a faire & legall waye"); then, turning to public legislation, the
body resolved that "henceforth none yt are within the Jurisdic[tion] of this
Court, shall trade with the natiues or Indians any peece or pistoll or gunn
or powder or shott . . .
From one colonist's remonstrance against his neighbor, Connecticut's
first act was passed. Similarly, other colonial governments, facing the
myriad difficulties of settlement and struggling to regulate all dimensions
of colonial life, were led "willy-nilly" by their inhabitants' petitions for
legislation." Vested with a variety of police, legislative, and judicial pow-
ers, assemblies responded to a wide spectrum of petitioners' concerns.
They adjudicated local offenses, disciplined servants' misfeasances, enacted
sumptuary laws, regulated tobacco packaging, and controlled colonists'
wages. No sharp line dividing constituents from representatives existed to
separate control of the legislative agenda from colonists' initiatives. Peti-
tions assured a seamlessness of public and private governance. Assemblies
would receive petitions, refer them to committees for consideration, and
then act upon the committees' recommendations. This process originated
more bills in pre-constitutional America than any other source of
legislation.9
6. 1 COLONIAL RECORDS OF CONNECTICUT: THE PUBLIC RECORDS OF THE COLONY OF CON-
NECTICUT 2 (1850) (date of assembly: 1650) [hereinafter CONNECTICUT RECORDS, cited with date of
assembly]. For reasons concerning access to material, this Note focuses on Connecticut history to make
inferences about other colonies.
7. Id.
8. Bailyn, The Origins of American Politics, in 1 PERSPECTIVES IN AMERICAN HISTORY 77-78
(1967); see also R. HARLOW, HISTORY OF LEGISLATIVE METHODS IN THE PERIOD BEFORE 1825, at
19-20 (Massachusetts petitioners covered range of issues, "they petitioned for anything they wanted,
and their wants were both varied and various;" committees which formed to hear petitions were
equally varied); id. at 66 (diversity of Massachusetts committees hearing petitions). See generally M.
CLARKE, PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGE IN THE AMERICAN COLONIES 209-10 (1943) (assemblies ex-
tended authority by responding to petitioners).
9. Perusal of the CONNECTICUT RECORDS highlights this fact. For example, in the Connecticut
General Assembly (its early name was the General Court) session of May, 1773, over five-sixths of
the resolutions were direct responses to residents' petitions and still the Assembly postponed consider-
ation of a further 250 petitions, including one petition from a slave. At this session, petitioners
prompted a naturalization bill, a reversal of a superior court judgment, debt discharges, public fishery
regulations, roadmaking resolutions, Indian land delimitations (upon petition by Indians), town tax
revisions, and constable replacements. See 14 CONNECTICUT RECORDS 94-132, 152-55 (1773); see
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The dialogue of petition and response between inhabitants and colonial
assemblies was intimately related to the structure of colonial politics.10
From the beginning, the primary responsibility of colonial assemblies was
the settlement of private disputes raised by petitions. The young assem-
blies, struggling for domestic authority, were especially attentive to citi-
zens' grievances and recognized that responsiveness to petitions was a way
of extending their jurisdiction. In addition, the local character of colonial
politics, where assemblies responded to information from inhabitants, even
the disenfranchised, made petitions vital initiatives for governmental
actions.
These conditions were the foundation for colonial assemblies' reliance
on, and inhabitants' ready recourse to, petitioning. That is, colonial as-
semblies, accustomed to quasi-judicial lawmaking and anxious to en-
courage petitions as sources of both jurisdiction and information, generally
favored citizens' rights to assembly consideration.
A. The Judicial Role of Colonial Assemblies
Connecticut Colony's legislature, like other colonial assemblies, per-
formed both legislative and judicial functions.11 Petitions for private bills,
petitions for public legislation, and petitions appealing courts' decisions
relied on this blurring of legislative and adjudicative processes. Aggrieved
persons could reformulate causes of action for judicial redress into griev-
ances of abridged liberties in order to secure legislative relief. At the same
time, petitioners' broad right to raise any matter for assembly considera-
tion itself impeded the development of separation of powers in colonial
governments. 12
also R. BAILEY, POPULAR INFLUENCE UPON PUBLIC POLICY 61 (1979) (most prolific source of Vir-
ginia Colony legislation was petitioning).
10. Descriptions of the colonial practice of petitioning may be found in several works on colonial
legislative processes. See, e.g., R. BUSHMAN, KING AND PEOPLE IN PROVINCIAL MASSACHUSETrS
46-54 (1985) (discussing colonial petitioning to Crown); M. CLARKE, supra note 8; R. HARLOW,
supra note 8, at 14-19, 64-68, 111 (1917) (general discussion); G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 162-96 (1969) (colonial attitudes towards representation seen in
petitioning).
R. BAILEY, supra note 9, gives a picture of early petitioning in the colony of Virginia. All social
classes were free to present complaints or requests to the House of Burgesses. Prior to 1660, this was
done in person; thereafter, local sheriffs posted notice of courthouse reception dates. In 1666, the
House of Burgesses established the Committee for Propositions and Grievances, which was reponsible
for investigating petitions. The volume of petitions continued to increase into the eighteenth century;
between 1750 and 1800 the legislature received on average over 200 petitions per session. Id. at
23-46. Assembly responsiveness and impartiality depended on the homogeneity of the Virginian colo-
nial community, however. Just as the erosion of this condition reduced the general utility of petition-
ing in Virginia (after 1800, petitions for legislative reapportionment, for internal improvements, and
on slavery matters were tangled in East-West sectional controversy), id. at 169-74, anti-slavery peti-
tioning to Congress was also a casualty of sharp regional and party disputes. See infra Section IV.
11. See M. CLARKE, supra note 8, at 15-60.
12. Black, Nathaniel Byfield, 1653-1733, in 62 PUBLICATIONS OF THE COLONIAL SOCIETY OF
The Yale Law Journal
1. Adjudication of Private Disputes: The Connecticut Colony
Most petitions in the early colonies involved private disputes that the
assemblies, acting in a quasi-judicial capacity, would investigate and re-
solve. Partly because the early colonies lacked strong judicial institutions,
the legislatures heard and resolved these conflicts."3
In 1770, Connecticut's General Assembly promulgated only fifteen laws
on its own initiative, while acting on over 150 causes, in law and equity,
brought by petitioners.14 A representative complaint alleged that one
"George Nichols had in an undue manner by artful and oppressive means
. . .obtained and gotten from the petitioner a deed of his house and lands
. . . .,,a The assembly, after considering a detailed committee report, de-
clared the deed null and void.'
Most early legislation was of similar minute, adjudicatory character. As
a result, it proceeded haphazardly, each bill a response to the special cir-
cumstances pleaded by petition. Debt actions,'17 estate distributions,' 8 and
divorce proceedings' were frequently brought by petitioners for legislative
settlement. Criminal cases appeared as well, most often in the form of
prayers for modification of sentence.20 Regularly, the reply to a petitioner
was legislation reversing a lower court's judgment."'
2. Adjudication and Public Petitions
Many petitions prompted legislation of general applicability. For exam-
ple, in 1723, the Connecticut General Assembly affirmed the Connecticut
superior courts' appellate jurisdiction over appeals against non-residents
MASSACHUSETTS 57, 79 (1984).
13. Id. at 58-59; see also Surrency, The Courts in the American Colonies, 11 AM. J. LEGAL
HIsT. 253, 257-61 (1967) (describing "nebulous beginnings" of independent judiciary in colonies);
Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article I1I: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65
B.U.L. REv. 205, 226-28 n.81 ("In some states the lack of judicial independence led to the wide-
spread assumption of judicial functions by the legislature itself.").
14. W. Hamersley, Connecticut-The Origins of Her Courts and Laws, in 18 PAMPHLET COL-
LECTION, No. 2 (available in Yale Law School Library).
15. 13 CONNECTICUT RECORDS 319-21 (1770).
16. Id.
17. See, e.g., 6 id. 454 (1724); 10 id. 427-29 (1755); 12 id. 313-14 (1764).
18. See, e.g., 3 id. 190 (1685); 6 id. 349 (1722) (assembly approves guardians' petition to divide
estate to finance deceased's son's continued education at Yale College); 10 id. 210-11 (1753).
19. See, e.g., 1 id. 275 (1655); 2 id. 292 & note * (1676). See generally DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS,
1724-1800, in CITY AND COUNTY DOCUMENTs, MSS 28B, Series III, H, Item 47, Folder M (exam-
ples) (available at New Haven Historical Society).
20. See, e.g., 13 CONNECTICUT RECORDS 160-61 (1669) (petitioner Baptist minister given lenient
punishment for performing marriage); 3 id. 197-98 & note * (1686) (bill passed granting petition for
sentencing leniency for youths guilty of "'night walking'" and stealing "'water milions' ").
21. See, e.g., 10 id. 215-16 (1753) (petitioner succeeds in staying execution of superior court
judgment); 12 id. 307-08 (1764) (superior court judgment held manifestly erroneous on petitioner's
appeal).
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upon receipt of a petition against a judicial ruling to the contrary.22 In
1686, in direct response to a petitioner's dispute over the conveyance of
inheritance titles, the assembly declared that "all lands dissposed by courts
in distributions of estates in land to legatees . . . shall belong to the sayd
legatees and their heires and assignes forever."23
In addition to initiating legislation, petitioners also asked for the en-
forcement of existing laws. Thus, in 1685, the Assembly responded to a
petitioner's request for a quasi-judicial opinion affirming a law requiring
"[lands to be tendered to the Town before they be sold to any but to the
inhabitants of the same town where they be situate." '24
These quasi-judicial responses to petitions regularly involved extensive
factual examinations, for which the Assembly delegated considerable pow-
ers to committees2 5 or local officials.26 The task of verifying the facts al-
leged in petitions led to authority to compel the attendance of witnesses
and petitioners.27 The above actions illustrate the uncircumscribed origi-
nal and appellate jurisdiction the General Assembly exercised in consider-
ing petitions. In fact, the Assembly did not divest itself of significant judi-
cial responsibilities until the adoption of the Connecticut Constitution of
1818.28
3. Fair Hearing and Reformation of the Petitioning Process
The concentration of legislative and judicial authority in one governing
body, coupled with the Colony's growth, led to a backlog of petitions. The
priority of fair hearing generated ongoing attempts to retain a semblance
of adjudicatory due process in the face of an oppressive number of peti-
tions. This priority was especially manifest in the elaborate rules gov-
erning petition pleadings. Specifically, the Assembly's notice and counter-
petition rules reflected the judicial character of petition consideration.
22. 6 id. 402 (1723).
23. 3 id. 216-17 & note + (1686).
24. 3 id. 186 & note § (1685).
25. Land boundary issues required especially broad legislative investigation. In 1770, for example,
the General Assembly replied to a land division petition by empowering a committee to redraw juris-
dictional lines among three towns. 13 id. 398-99 (1770). Note, however, the response to the Assembly
from a similarly commissioned committee nearly a century earlier: "'finding their task too hard for
them, they left it not finished.'" 2 id. 86 & note * (1668).
26. The General Assembly would answer some petitions by ordering town selectmen to arbitrate
disputes. E.g., 2 id. 84 (1668) (female petitioner's claim referred to town officials).
27. R. HARLOW, supra note 8, at 111; see, e.g., 6 CONNECTICUT RECORDS 54 (1718) (act com-
pelling petitioners' appearance before Assembly). And at times whole assemblies took on an investiga-
tory role. One occurrence in Georgia provides a dramatic illustration of assembly response. The
House, acting on petitions which alleged inhuman prison treatment, "'immediately resolved itself into
a Committee of the Whole House upon said Petition,' and went in a body to the jail to look into the
matter." R. HARLOW, supra note 8, at 97 (citation omitted).
28. See generally JUDICIAL AND CIVIL HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT, ch. 8 (D. Loomis & J. Cal-
houn eds. 1895) (detailing General Assembly evolution).
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Summons requirements were strict, 9 and petitions often were dismissed
or postponed when concerned parties had not received notice."0 Adverse
testimony was important, for the act of petition or remonstrance "call[ed]
for due witness to be borne against it ....
In 1744, the Assembly codified much of the adjudicatory process of pe-
titioning. The new regulations required that adverse parties be cited, that
summons and copies of the petition be supplied to all concerned persons, 32
and that "if upon the tryall of the cause it doth appear that either the
petitioners or the person or persons cited doe or have given the other any
uniust trouble, the party wronged shall be allowed his iust cost and dam-
ages as in other cases." '33
Eighteenth century commercial and demographic expansion in the Col-
ony, along with the concomitant explosion of petitions in both law and
equity, led to alterations in the method of legislative consideration. The
Assembly sought to balance the guarantees of judicial proceedings against
the volume of popular petitioning. Adopting a cautious attitude towards
petitioning, "being sensible that the publick charge is much increased by a
multiplicity of petitions for things of less value than the charge of deciding
them, and the publick affairs also thereby further obstructed, '"" the As-
sembly moved to restrict the numbers by raising fees for presenting peti-
tions and limiting petitioners' access to the assembly according to amounts
in controversy. A 1718 order denied consideration to petitions on matters
of less than fifteen pounds.3 5
Additional efforts to streamline the consideration process appeared in a
1762 order, requiring the Assembly secretary and petitioners' agents to
regulate the daily flow of petitions by assigning each communication a
docket number and confirming notification to concerned parties.36 Typi-
cally, committees were appointed to recommend actions on each petition; 37
29. See, e.g., 4 CONNEC-TcuT RECORDS 273-74 (1698) (petition dismissed for improper
summons).
30. See, e.g., 2 id. 247-48 & note * (1674) (town selectmen's petition for permission to move into
Hartford County jurisdiction not acted upon until counter-petitions from neighboring towns solicited
and received); see also 2 id. 195 & note t[ (1673) (action on petition postponed until interested parties
were notified); 4 id. 29-30 (1690) (same).
31. 3 id. 72 & note t (1680) (petitioner, charged with contempt, given right to appear and defend
in Assembly and, editor implies, right to summon accuser).
32. The exchange had to occur five days prior to the assembly hearing. 9 id. 61 (1744).
33. 4 id. 246 (1698).
34. 6 id. 54 (1718). See generally R. HARLOW, supra note 8, at 64 ("Probably the greatest defect
in procedure in the average colonial assembly had been the want of time-sharing schemes for dealing
with petitions.").
35. 6 CONNECTCTr RECORDS 54 (1718) (actual "tryal" cost petitioners the additional sum of
three pounds).
36. 12 id. 63 (1762).
37. See 9 id. 60 (1744) (committee's authority to gather evidence included power to compel parties
to appear and be examined under oath).
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the assembly could abbreviate this process with direct debate and hand
vote resolution. 8 Still, by late 1769, the business of adjudicating petitions
became so onerous that the Assembly experimented by withdrawing the
right of parties to hearings "viva voce" before the Assembly.39 These pro-
visions, a first trespass on the adjudicatory process of petition considera-
tion, were hastily repealed as detrimental to the rights of the populace.40
Whereas conditions of admissibility, such as amounts in controversy, were
manipulated to ease the pressure of petitions, the judicial guarantee of full
consideration for those petitions still heard remained inviolate.
The colonial assemblies did retain one important and longstanding re-
straint on petitioning, again of judicial character: the threat of contempt
proceedings. Allegations discovered to be ambiguous or false could lead to
dismissal 41 or to charges against the petitioner. In an early session, a
Hartford petitioner was held in contempt for not substantiating his accu-
satory petition.42 Petitioners faced more severe contempt charges when
their prayers challenged colonial laws.4 3 Thus, in 1675, recalcitrant peti-
tioners from Stonington, who desired either the annulment of
"prejudiciall" tax laws or "a clear discovery of the rule and reason upon
which such acts are grounded,' 44 provoked the Assembly's ire. Deciding
that "such practices ought to be crushed and due testimonie to be borne
against the same," the Assembly punished the petitioners with fines and
barred several from public office. 45
38. 2 id. 188 (1672) (direct debate over petition for land grants resulting in fine remission); 2 id.
79 (1667) (petition appealing lower court fine decided by hand vote).
39. 13 id. 301 (1770).
40. 14 id. 79 (1773). Some restrictions were retained. For instance, controversies valued under
£ 100, hitherto brought by petition to the Assembly, were diverted to lower courts. Id.
41. See, e.g., 4 id. 55 (1691) (landowners' petition for township status dismissed because "none of
the principle proprietors of sayd land [were] in the petition").
42. 1 id. 111 (1644).
43. See, e.g., 3 id. 72-73 & note t (1680) (contempt punishment for abusive petition protesting
colony laws and governor's actions); see also I W. McLOUGHLIN, 1 NEw ENGLAND DISSENT,
1630-1833: THE BAPTISTS AND THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 71-72 (1971) (Massa-
chusetts General Court interpreting clemency petition as affront to justice, forced some of sixty-six
signers to retract statements and fined others). Compare 3 COMMONS DEBATES, 1621 (W. Notestein,
F. Relf & H. Simpson eds. 1935) (petitioner alleging bribery ordered to appear "and iustyfy his
petition or be punished"; subsequently, petition declared "scandalous" for lack of proof, but lenient
punishment was advised so as "not to affright men from complaynt nor yet to give too much libertye."
4 Id. 404).
44. 2 CONNECTICUT RECORDS 577 app. (1675) (full text of petition).
45. Id. at 258-59 (1675).
These several colonial episodes of conflict between the right to petition and the integrity of legisla-
tive bodies anticipated the nineteenth century controversy in Congress. If communications to one's
representative could be arbitrarily ignored, refused, or punished as intrusions on legislative freedom,
popular sovereignty was threatened. See G. WOOD, supra note 10, at 363 (For radical Whigs, peti-
tions, instructions, and direct democracy were tied to distrust of representative institutions and refusal
to identify individuals' rights with, or subordinate them to, the wills of elected representatives.). Un-
due assertions of parliamentary privilege-punishing petitioners who were said to menace the dignity
of the assembly-jeopardized the entire institution of petitioning.
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B. Petitions and the Extension of Legislative Jurisdiction
Colonial assemblies seized on petitions to extend their authority.46
Struggling for authority to tax and, above all, to legislate, the young as-
semblies drew on their close associations with local inhabitants to legiti-
mize their activities.47 Petitioners often appealed for extraordinary relief,
especially when existing law supplied no remedy. The trend of favorable
assembly responses shows a steady extension of legislative reach into in-
tercolony militia concerns, 48 local welfare,49 the regulation of private law
enforcement" ° and Indian affairs, 51 all matters previously left either to
private responsibility or to British authority.
Assembly aggrandizement was particularly enhanced by the volume of
petitions calling for legislative responses in such areas as tax policy, 52 land
distribution,5" monopoly grants, and trade and licensing privileges.54
Manufacturing and turnpike companies, bank charters, ferry privileges
and a variety of other operations in Connecticut's early economy were all
acquired through petitions for assembly approval. Assembly authority
necessarily expanded in schizophrenic manner. Petitioners retained vital,
albeit uncoordinated, lawmaking initiative. Bills responded to the circum-
stances recited by each petition. Thus, for example, the Colony's tax laws
46. See generally J. GREEN, THE QUEST FOR POWER: THE LOWER HOUSES OF ASSEMBLY IN
THE SOUTHERN ROYAL COLONIES 1689-1776, at 14-15 (1963) (consolidation of lower houses' power
relied on representational link to colonists); M. KAMMEN, DEPUTYES AND LIBERTYES: ORIGINS OF
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT IN COLONIAL AMERICA 10 (1969) (aggressive lower houses sought
jurisdiction and power to initiate laws).
47. By the end of the seventeenth century, assemblies in all the colonies, save perhaps Delaware,
had formed committees to consider grievances. R. HARLOW, supra note 8, at 9.
48. See, e.g., 2 CONNECTICUT RECORDS 276 (1676) (mother's successful petition for funds for
neighboring colony's treatment and release of wounded militiaman).
49. See, e.g., 2 id. 255 (1675) (assembly intervenes to guarantee meadow lands to petitioner); 2 id.
326 (1677) (petition for child custody and support); 12 id. 309-10 (1764) (petition for child support
funds); 13 id. 612 (1772) (ill minister's prayer for family support granted); see also Olson, Agricul-
tural Economy and the Population in Eighteenth-Century Connecticut, in 40 TERCENTENARY COM-
MISSION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 25 (1935) (Bakhamsted and Colebrook town petitions in
1780 for tax abatement on grounds of impoverishment and infertile lands).
50. See, e.g., 2 CONNECTICUT RECORDS 254 (1675) (Assembly order for estate seizure if court
judgment for petitioner ignored); 3 id. 203-04 (1686) (constable sent to caution petitioner's cattle-
thieving son); 13 id. 613 (1772) (assembly approval of petitioner's request for costs of apprehending
felon).
51. See, e.g., 4 id. 280 (1698) (Indians' petition for colony protectorship approved).
52. See, e.g., infra note 56.
53. See, e.g., 2 id. 188 (1672) (mix of tax and land policies in response to petition); 2 id. 210
(1673) (petition that land be granted for plantation). See generally Bailyn, supra note 8, at 79 (con-
siderable power of colonial assemblies over land distribution).
54. See, e.g., I CONNECTICUT RECORDS 309 (1657-58) (petition for right to contract with Indi-
ans); 2 id. 108 (1669) (tax relief to petitioner owning iron works); 2 id. 254-55 (1675) (ten year
monopoly and tax immunity awarded to petitioner constructing mill to produce and export "rape
oyle"); 2 id. 325 (1677) (petition for special export license); 4 id. 139 (1695) (petitions for permission
to practice medicine); 4 id. 263 (1698) (petitioner authorized to levy bridge toll); 14 id. 128 (1773)
(petition for fishery privileges).
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were a babel of special measures enacted in response to individuals and
towns' petitions for particular relief.5
The jurisdictional growth of assemblies through the receipt and disposi-
tion of petitions was a complex process, forcing the legislatures to be sen-
sitive to competing interests. Petitions for privileges and dispensations,
such as fishery rights, land grants or town boundaries, indeed petitions on
most controversial issues, involved a series of communications. A peti-
tioner's application commonly led to an initial notice from the assembly
soliciting counter-petitions. A committee examination followed, involving
contact with all affected groups. Lastly, the assembly tallied the petition-
ers' requests, appraised the committee reports, and acted according to the
public will.56 Latent in this sequence was petitioners' threat of appeal
through petitions to English authority.57
Colonial assemblies also used petitions to extend their authority against
gubernatorial powers and to support jurisdictional claims against neigh-
boring colonies. For example, in the spring of 1670, Connecticut's Gover-
nor Winthrop refused to grant the petition of Narragansett inhabitants
who opposed Rhode Island's claims to the region. 8 Winthrop, who had
himself negotiated the territorial concession, spoke against the General
Assembly's jurisdictional authority to advocate the petitioners' prayer. His
objection was ignored;59 in fact, several years earlier the Assembly had
responded to proprietors' petitions by repudiating the governor's agree-
ment "inasmuch as it was entered into without authority from the Gen-
eral [Assembly]."'60
The General Assembly's handling of several other petitions suggests its
ability to restrain the authority of governors. Indians who petitioned for
55. See, e.g., 1 id. 201 (1649) (petitions led to tax modifications); 2 id. 188 (1672) (same); 2 id.
309 (1677) (same); 4 id. 55 (1691) (same); 14 id. 120 (1773) (same).
56. Jefferson's "Bill for Religious Freedom" was enacted in this manner. Between 1776 and
1786, several sessions of Virginia's House of Burgesses were "literally flooded" with petitions de-
manding dissenters' exemptions from taxes to support the Anglican Church. At last in 1785, the
assembly formally requested Virginians to express their views. Thousands of petitions came in reply;
over 11,000 opposed an assessment bill and just over 1,000 were in favor. R. BAILEY, supra note 9, at
46.
57. A Quaker petition of 1708 read "we are very desireous to have those Laws repealed ...
which Indeed seemeth little less than oppression. Otherwise wee think it our duty to address the
Queen . . . ." 1 W. McLoUGHLIN, supra note 43, at 165. For additional examples, see id. at 181
(Quakers send agent to petition Queen Anne against restraints on religious freedom imposed by Mas-
sachusetts Colony); id. at 190-97 (Quakers threaten to petition Crown against assessments); id. at
395 (Separates send agent to England to petition); id. at 536-45 (Baptist petition against ministerial
support law dismissed; petitioners appeal to England where law disallowed).
58. 2 CONNEcTICUT RECORDS 526-41 (1665-77), especially 533-34 (1669-70). "Harmon Gar-
ret, alias Wequascooke, Governor of the Pequots" petitioned for protection and described the threat-
ening Rhode Islanders as "'men that weare hats & cloaths like Englishmen, but have dealt with us
like wolves and beares,'" id. at 529 (1667).
59. Id. at 534 (1670).
60. Id. at 527 (1663).
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the governor's benefactorship addressed their petition to the Assembly;
the governor's own guard had to petition the Assembly for their arms and
expenses;62 and when petitions did go before the governor, they frequently
came on referral from the Assembly.63 When abusive petitions were sent
directly to the governor, final authority for contempt proceedings rested in
the Assembly's discretion. 4
Boundary petitions enabled the General Assembly to assert jurisdic-
tional claims against neighboring colonies. Connecticut pressed its dispute
with Rhode Island65 on the ground that the inhabitants of the disputed
lands, through petitions, had indicated that Connecticut was their pre-
ferred government.66 In its negotiations with Rhode Island, the Connecti-
cut Assembly insisted on its duty to respond to petitioners, to do "'what
duty requires of us, in order to the relief of or oppressed neigh-
bours . . "67
Still more dramatic was the Connecticut Assembly's use of petitions to
repeal a 1713 border agreement with Massachusetts. During negotiation
of the agreement, the towns ceded to Massachusetts had not been con-
sulted. Higher Massachusetts taxes provoked these towns, in 1747, to pe-
tition for re-joinder with Connecticut. Ignoring its agreement, the General
Assembly voted to receive the petitioning towns.6 8
Colonial assemblies similarly employed petitions to test and extend au-
thority against British control. The numerous petitions for land grants
facilitated the Connecticut Assembly's hasty distribution of territory to
private owners. The action was provoked by the impending arrival of Sir
Edmund Andros and the Crown's seizure of the New England colonies'
governments and property.6 Another incident arose from the fact that pe-
titioners were often awarded trade privileges "any law to the contrary
notwithstanding. 7 0 In 1709, when England passed a harsh customs law
which Connecticut colonists thought infringed their charter rights, the As-
sembly took advantage of petitions from shipowners whose vessels had
been seized to challenge the authority of the royal collector. Despite his
61. 4 id. 280 (1698).
62. 14 id. 122 (1773).
63. See, e.g., 4 id. 215, 217 (1697) (assembly referred petition from town of Wallingford to
governor).
64. See, e.g., 3 id. 72 & note t (1680), supra in note 43.
65. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
66. 2 CONNECTIcuT RECORDS 527 (1663).
67. Id. at 534 (1670).
68. See Hooker, Boundaries of Connecticut, in 11 TERCENTENARY COMMISSION OF THE STATE
OF CONNECTICUT 21 (1933).
69. 3 CONNECTICUT RECORDS 220-21 (1686), 225 & note t (1686-87) (plantation lands distrib-
uted to petitioners).
70. 2 id. 325 (1677).
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protestations against the exercise of jurisdiction by colonial courts, the col-
lector was evicted from office.71
C. Petitions as Sources of Information in Colonial Politics
The adjudicatory character of early legislation and the colonial assem-
blies' self-aggrandizing efforts were predicated on the local nature of colo-
nial politics. In communities that lacked developed media or party struc-
tures and that provided limited suffrage, petitioning supplied vital
information to assemblies. Few representatives were trained as legislators;
most were farmers, holding short terms of office and busy with private
responsibilities. They had neither time nor expertise to discover indepen-
dently the colony's woes or to determine solutions.
Thus, the town of Stonington began a 1668 petition with a common
preface:
'Least multitude of busines might overwhelme you, & and our bee-
ing remoat & as ovt of sight might too much burie us in oblivion, or
want of information might render you the les sensible of our condi-
tion, wee make bold to remind you, & if it maye bee to add a litell
breath to the saylls and fethers to the winges of your solicitous in-
deavours in our behalfe ....
Information from petitions was essential to the Colony's system of pro-
viding for those in need. Public funds to reimburse those who cared for
orphans, the sick, or the insane, assistance to towns in times of hardship,
and protection of debtors all depended upon the continual flow of petitions
from individuals and towns.7"
Not only the enfranchised population, but also unrepresented
groups-notably women,74  felons,7 5 Indians,7" and, in some cases,
slaves 7 -represented themselves and voiced grievances through petitions.
This broadening of participation and access to relief mitigated some of the
hardship of limited colonial suffrage. The right to petition vested these
groups with a minimum form of citizenship: petitioning meant that no
group in colonial society was entirely without political power.
71. See Hooker, The Colonial Trade of Connecticut, in 50 TERCENTENARY COMMISSION OF THE
STATE OF CONNECTICUT 18-25 (1936).
72. 2 CONNECTICUT RECORDS 530 (1668).
73. See, e.g., supra note 49.
74. See, e.g., I CONNECTICUT RECORDS 319 & note t (1658) (women petitioners complaining of
minister's indiscretion and seeking replacement); see also supra note 26 (female petition).
75. See, e.g., supra note 27 (example of prisoner's petition).
76. See, e.g., 3 CONNECTIcuT RECORDS 219 (1686) (Podunck Indian land petition); 4 id. 280
(1698) (Pequott Indian petition); 14 id. 130 (1773) (Massatucksett tribe land petition).
77. See, e.g., 2 PUBLIC RECORDS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT, 1778-1780, at 427-28 (1779)
(approval of emancipation petition from "a negro man slave" owned by resident who joined British).
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Legislation, particularly concerning agricultural and commercial devel-
opments 7 8 proceeded in trial-and-error fashion and was periodically mod-
ified according to the opinions of petitioners. Information from petitions
also led to foundings of new towns and counties 7 9 settlements of boundary
disputes8" and efforts at internal improvements.8" The history of road-
making in colonial Connecticut can be traced through colonists' petitions
to their towns and the General Assembly. Petitioners seeking convenient
routes to Sabbath gatherings, for example, confronted counter-petitioners
who were fearful that roads would cut up their tillage.82
Petitioning was also used to expose public oppressions. Maladministra-
tion or corruption among public agents," excessive taxation,84 injustices
perpetrated by courts 5 and misconduct by local officials (for example, bad
magistrates 6 or lax church wardens8 7) were brought to public attention
by petitioners' ire.
Close assembly oversight of colonists' spiritual behavior was assured by
the stream of information from ecclesiastical petitions.88 This area espe-
cially was marked by a dynamic exchange of petitions and counter-peti-
tions. The Massachusetts and Connecticut colonial records are replete
with petitions from dissenters who sought to disestablish the Congrega-
tional churches." Religious taxation caused particular controversy. For
78. See, e.g., 3 CONNECrICUT RECORDS 216 (1886) (town petition for crop protection leading to
order that proprietors fence land); 7 id. 480-81 (1773)(petitioners' information of cattle thefts
prompting criminal enactment); see also supra note 54.
79. See, e.g., 3 id. 240 (1687) (petition leading to founding of town of Danbury).
80. See, e.g., 2 id. 65-66 (1667) (committee to settle boundary disputes established in response to
petition); 3 id. 203 (1686) (officers appointed to study boundary dispute between Norwalk and Fair-
field in response to petition).
81. See, e.g., 14 id. 96-97 (1773) (petition for lottery privilege to raise funds to dredge Connecti-
cut River); id. at 117 (1773) (fisheries commission formed upon petitioner's motion); id. at 118-19
(petition to develop river landing approved).
82. See, e.g., 2 id. 255 (1675) (petition leading to bill for highway construction); 14 id. 118
(1773) (selectmen petition for replanning of impassable roads); 15 id. 161 (1775) (petition leading to
taxation for highway repair). See generally Mitchell, Roads and Road-Making in Colonial Connecti-
cut, in 14 TERCENTENARY COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 6, 8 (1933) (persons'
communications to Assembly concerning roads).
83. See, e.g., 14 CONNECTICUT RECORDS 132-33 (1773) (New London petitioners' complaints
against indolent constable and tax collector led to new appointment).
84. See, e.g., 1 id. 201 (1649) (petitions by Stratford inhabitants against tax confusion; assembly
ordered town leaders to explain rates to townspersons).
85. Sentence modifications were a common response to petitions. E.g., supra note 20.
86. See, e.g., 2 CONNECTICUT RECORDS 115 & note t (1669).
87. See, e.g., supra note 74.
88. See, e.g., 1 W. McLoUGHLIN, supra note 43, (New England colonies assemblies' responses to
Baptists petitions); 2 CONNECTIcUT RECORDS 71 & note (1667) (town petition to form church).
89. Likewise, Baptist towns provoked Congregationalists to petition for relief. In 1711, for exam-
ple, the Congregationalists of Swansea, Massachusetts petitioned the General Court to divide Swansea
into two towns. Conscious of the volatile circumstances surrounding the request, the Court invited
Swansea's selectmen to counter-petition. Elaborate legal arguments and accusations were exchanged.
The Court considered more petitions and appointed a committee to investigate; the Congregationalists
threatened to petition the Privy Council. At last, in 1727, the Congregationalist town of Barrington
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instance, when a tax exemption law expired in 1739, Massachusetts Bap-
tists commissioned agents to petition the General Court [Assembly] for
reenactment. The petitioners were requested to submit preferred mea-
sures; when the Assembly made revisions, the Baptists' agents drafted a
second petition protesting that the changes "'by no means redress the
Grievances complained of by ye people called Baptists.' "90
III. THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND THE NEW NATION
The right of petition, so fundamental in colonial politics, was included
in the Bill of Rights.91 That the Framers meant to imply a corresponding
governmental duty of a fair hearing seems clear given the history of peti-
tioning in the colonies and the colonists' outrage at England's refusal to
listen to their grievances. 2
The ratification controversy itself was, in large part, a debate among
Federalist and Antifederalist petitioners and state assemblies. In Dela-
ware, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, widespread petitioning provided the
catalyst for ratification conventions.9"
Although Congress, in its first session, approved the right of petition
virtually without comment, two historic episodes are noteworthy. First,
when Madison introduced his proposed list of amendments on June 8,
1789, he separated the clause for the rights of assembly, consultation, and
petition from the clause containing the free expression guarantees of
was formed. 1 W. McLoUGHLIN, supra note 43, at 140-46.
90. Quoted in id. 239-41, 239. The Connecticut Assembly also passed a bill granting a religious
tax exemption to petitioning Baptists. 7 CONNECTICUT RECORDS 257 (1729).
91. See supra note 1; see also 2 THE WORKS OF DANIEL WEBSTER 232-33 (1858) (reception and
consideration of petitions were among first actions of House of Representatives in 1789).
92. "In every stage of these Oppressions We have Petitioned for Redress in the most humble
terms: Our repeated Petitions have been answered only by repeated injury." The Declaration of Inde-
pendence para. 30 (U.S. 1776); see also 1 JOURNALS OF CONGRESS 67-92 (1775) (petition to King);
id. at 117-18 (resolution protesting Parliament's interference with right of petition); 2 JOURNALS OF
CONGRESS 158-62 (1777) (petition to King).
93. 3 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 50-54 (M.
Jensen ed. 1978) (Delaware); id. at 134-37 (New Jersey). In Pennsylvania, Federalists circulating
petitions harassed and blacklisted citizens who refused to sign. 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 620 (M. Jensen ed. 1976). Between September 24 and
29, 1787, 4,000 persons petitioned the legislature, id. at 130, whose resolution calling for a convention
expressly rested on "the sense of great numbers of the good people of this state, already signified in
petitions and declarations to this House . . . ." Id. at 101. After ratification, the Antifederalists
launched a counter-petition campaign to reverse the results. Id. at 709-24. Eventually, over 6,000
citizens petitioned the assembly. Despite its failure, this well documented counter-petition campaign
provides vivid insight into the mechanics of petitioning (e.g., form petitions, distributions, counter-
petitions, solicitation strategies) just prior to adoption of the petition clause in the Bill of Rights.
Significantly, the Pennsylvania Assembly's decision "not to attend to" a petition of 750 inhabitants
opposed to ratification provoked outcry against such "contempt and obloquy" of petitioners' rights. 15
THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 44.
The Philadelphia Independent Gazetteer (Dec. 19, 1787) responded: "Is it improper for freemen to
petition for their rights? If it be; then I say that the impropriety consisted only in their not demand-
ing them." Id. at 45.
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speech and the press.94 The express function of the assembly-petition
clause was to protect citizens "applying to the Legislature . . . for a re-
dress of their grievances. ''1 5
Second, both the House and Senate debated whether to include with the
guarantees of free speech, press, and petition, "the people's right to 'in-
struct their Representatives.' "96 Members defeated the amendment 7 be-
cause they feared that obligatory instructions would subvert Congress' de-
liberative character and lead to irreconcilable factionalism. Yet, in
statements denying the right, members expressly affirmed Congress' duty
to receive and consider, although not to be bound by, citizens' communica-
tions. Thus, while refusing to vest individuals and groups with the power
to bind Congress, and while guarding jealously their discretion to judge
and reject instructions as unwise, the Framers of the Bill of Rights none-
theless maintained that citizens' "instructions," like petitions, would be
heard and considered.98
Indeed, in Congress' first decades petitions were received and consid-
ered, typically by referral to committees. The petition-response mecha-
nism dealt procedurally with such controversial issues as contested election
results,99 the National Bank,100 the expulsion of Cherokees from Geor-
gia,10 1 land distribution,'10 2 the abolition of dueling,'0 3 government in the
94. 2 B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1026 (1971).
95. Id.; cf. Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REV. 245, 255
("The First Amendment does not protect a 'freedom to speak.' It protects the freedom of those activi-
ties of thought and communication by which we 'govern.' It is concerned, not with a private right, but
with a public power, a governmental responsibility.").
96. 2 B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 94, at 1052-1105 (House debates).
97. Id. at 1105 (House vote negative, 10-41); id. at 1146 (Senate vote negative, 2-14).
98. Id. at 1093-94 (right to consult goes no further than petitioning, but representatives have duty
to inquire into petitioners' suggested measures) (statement of R. Sherman); id. at 1094-95 (right to
consult Congress is non-binding, but Congress has responsibility never to shut its ears to petitions)
(statement of E. Gerry); id. at 1096 (right to bring non-binding instructions to Congress' attention is
protected) (statement of J. Madison).
99. See, e.g., [1 Misc.] 20 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: DOCUMENTS, LEGISLATIVE AND EXECU-
TIVE OF THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 5, 8, 9 (1978) (1st ed. 1834)
(petitions and responses concerning disputed election of William Smith) [hereinafter AMERICAN PA-
PERS, cited by volume, document number, Congress, session, page, and original year]; [1 Misc.] 20
AMERICAN PAPERS Nos. 41-42, 3d Cong., 1st Sess. 73-75 (1794) (petitioners brought before Com-
mittee of Elections concerning contested election of Albert Gallatin); [1 Misc.] 20 AMERICAN PAPERS
No. 197, 9th Cong., 1st Sess. 436 (1806) (objection to election of Michael Lieb). See generally [2
Misc.] AMERICAN PAPERS at viii (indexed under "Reports of Committees of Election of the House of
Representatives").
100. See, e.g., S. JOURNAL, 22d Cong., 1st Sess. 65, 183 (1832) (Senator Dallas presented memo-
rial of president, directors, and company of Bank of United States praying for renewal of charter).
101. See, e.g., H.R. Doc. No. 145, 20th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-3 (1829); H.R. Doc. No. 106, 21st
Cong., 2d Sess. 1-5 (1831).
102. See generally [1-8 PUBLIC LANDS] AMERICAN PAPERS (great number of petitions referred to
Committee on Private Land Claims).
103. See H. JOURNAL, 25th Cong., 2d Sess. 647 (1838) (petitions prompting appointment of se-
lect committee to consider legislation abolishing dueling).
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territories,10 4 the Alien and Sedition Acts, 0 5 and the slave trade.106 Gen-
erally, favorable legislation or an adverse report halted further petitioning.
Nonetheless, systemic strains appeared early in the nineteenth century.
Since the daily business of Congress began with the reading by each state
of its petitions, too many petitions could bring proceedings to a standstill.
Groups like the American Anti-Slavery Society emerged with national
constituencies able to mobilize such petitioning drives. The development of
nationwide petitioning efforts, coupled with the Jacksonian sentiment that
representatives owe "unrelaxing responsibility to the vigilance of public
opinion,"' 1 0 7 made the petitioning process less a means by which legislators
were informed of public opinion, and more an offensive device for propa-
ganda. Failure to satisfy the petitioners' demands became a political gar-
rote for accountability. 0 8
Fundamentally, the right of petition lacked a secure foundation in the
national legislature. Its roots in local assemblies vested with investigatory
duties disappeared. The close geographical association between petitioners
and colonial legislatures was lost.1 9 Developing judicial institutions re-
104. See, e.g., [1 Misc.] 20 AMERICAN PAPERS No. 122, 6th Cong., 1st Sess. 203, 207 (1800)
(petitioners seeking democratization of government of territority denied in committee); [1 Misc.] 20
AMERICAN PAPERS 8th Cong., 2d Sess. 396-99, 417-18 (1804-05) (Louisiana planters petitioning to
alter gubernatorial government; committee resolved "[tihat provisions ought to be made by law for
extending to the inhabitants of Louisiana the right of self-government").
105. See, e.g., 2 ABRIDGEMENT OF THE DEBATES OF CONGRESS: 1789 TO 1856, at 373, 384
(1857) (by early 1799, over 6,000 signatures against Acts sent to committee, which reported unfavor-
ably; debate lengthened because "subject . . .had been brought before the House by the people, and
ought, therefore, to receive a full discussion," id. at 384). [1 Misc.] 20 AMERICAN PAPERS 5th Cong.,
3d Sess. 181-84 (1799); see also [1 Misc.] 20 AMERICAN PAPERS No. 137, 6th Cong., 1st Sess. 215
(1800) (petitioners contesting Senate contempt resolution against Pennsylvania editor).
106. See, e.g., [1 Misc.] 20 AMERICAN PAPERS No. 44, 3d Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1794) (Quaker
petition leading directly to enactment of Federal Slave Trade Act of 1794, which prohibited "the
fitting out any ship or vessel in any port of the United States" for slave trade abroad), discussed in
W. WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA, 1760-1848, at 86
(1977).
107. An Introductory Statement of the Democratic Principle, from THE DEMOCRACTrIC REV.
(Oct. 1837), in SOCIAL THEORIES OF JACKSONIAN DEMOCRACY 21, 23 (J. Blau ed. 1954). For other
early nineteenth-century discussion of this matter, compare Virginia Assembly Report, 4 AM. L.J.
571, 587 (n.s.) (J. Hall ed. 1813) (Virginia assembly resolution declaring "indubitable right of state-
legislatures, to instruct their senators in Congress, on all points" and to deny appointment to individu-
als who refuse obedience) with Instructions to Representatives, 4 AM. JURIST 314 (Oct. 1830) (argu-
ing that constituents' instructions be limited to advisory role lest directives govern Congressional
proceedings).
108. In arguing that the ballot was sufficient protection for popular sovereignty, the Federalists
anticipated precisely this danger of inserting in the Constitution a petition clause which "'give[s]
people an idea, that as individuals, or in town meetings, they have a power paramount to that of the
Legislature.'" N.Y. Daily Advertiser (Dec. 31, 1787) cited in 14 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 202 note 3.
109. The concept of a "natural limit of democracy" was shared by Federalists and Antifederalists
alike. See G. DIETZE, THE FEDERALIST 122 nn.60, 69 (1960). Antifederalists argued that citizens'
self-government and immediate intercourse with their assembly, for instance through petitions, would
be sacrificed if powers were vested in national representatives elected biannually and seated in a
distant capital. See, e.g., THE ANTIFEDERALISTS 107-08, 133-34, 169, 184, 192, 212-13, 377-78 (C.
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moved private grievances from legislative attention.11 Congress, with its
enumerated constitutional powers, did not rely on petitions to expand its
jurisdictional reach. Finally, broadened franchise and the evolving party
system diminished the need for legislators to inform themselves through
popular, localized petitions.
IV. THE CRISIS OVER ABOLITIONIST PETITIONS
The slavery dispute brought these strains to a crisis. When abolitionists,
invoking the First Amendment petition guarantee to secure a hearing and
response, began to petition aggressively in the 1830's, Congress chose to
retreat behind a legislative process that was inhospitable to activist
petitioning.""
Congress first reacted to the abolitionists with motions to refuse their
prayers.1 12 Later, members urged that petitions be tabled immediately or
referred to select committees but that no action be taken.,,' In 1840, the
House capitulated to Southern pressure for an absolute "gag" on anti-
slavery papers by stating that no petitions or resolutions "praying the abo-
lition of slavery. . . shall be received by this House, or entertained in any
way whatever. 1 1 4 Controversy over both this and previous "gag rules"
provoked heated discussion of the constitutional meaning of the right to
petition.1 1 5
Kenyon ed. 1985).
110. See, e.g., [1 Misc.] 20 AMERICAN PAPERS Nos. 51, 65, 3d Cong., 2d Sess. 81, 123-24, 123
(1794-95) (New Hampshire legislature's petition to Congress against federal court action denied as
"wholly judicial" question); [1 Misc.] 20 AMERICAN PAPERS No. 102, 5th Cong., 2d Sess. 163-66
(1798) (Quaker petitioners told to withdraw memorial concerning manumitted slaves because state
court proper and adequate forum); 11 Misc.] 20 AMERICAN PAPERS No. 160, 7th Cong., 2d Sess. 340
(1803) (lower federal judges' petitions protesting law depriving them of offices said to involve constitu-
tional question better handled by courts).
111. Standard historical works on abolitionism and American constitutional history contain only
incomplete examinations of the 1830's petition crisis. See, e.g., G. BARNES, THE ANTISLAVERY IM-
PULSE, 1830-1844, at 88-150 (1933) (detail on theological and organizational underpinnings of anti-
slavery petition campaigns); R. NYE, FETrERED FREEDOM: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE SLAVERY
CONTROVERSY, 1830-1860, at 41-85 (1963) (mail interruption); 2 H. VON HOLST, THE CONSTITU-
TIONAL AND POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 235-92, 467-86 (1888) (general
discussion).
112. See, e.g., [1 Misc.] 20 AMERICAN PAPERS No. 13, 1st Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1790).
113. See, e.g., H. JOURNAL, 25th Cong., 2d Sess. 127 (1837); H.R. Doc. No. 215, 20th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1828); see also W. WIECEK, supra note 106, at 184.
114. CONG. GLOBE, 26th Cong., 1st Sess. 150 (1840).
115. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 3, 28th Cong., 1st Sess. 14-20 (1844), reported in REPS. OF
COMMS. No. 3, 28th Cong., 1st Sess. 14-20 (1844); cf. Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide
to Constitutional Interpretation, 27 STAN. L. REV. 585 (discussing legislators' duty to interpret and
honor Constitution).
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A. The Southern Position
Championing the slave-holding states in the Senate, John Calhoun
viewed the requirement of consideration as a grave menace and a funda-
mental violation of each house's constitutional right to determine the rules
of its proceedings." 6 Southern representatives denied that the right of pe-
tition extended to control of assembly action, arguing that assemblies
would be little more than "passive receptacles" were petitioners' rights
held superior to legislative necessities.11 7 Thus, Calhoun supported a
sharp demarcation between citizenry and legislators. The right of the for-
mer to assemble and communicate opinions to the government ceased
upon presentation of a petition;11 thereafter, the legislative domain was
absolute and the assembly had full discretion to interpret and devise its
own rules.119
Southerners also decried petitioners' use of the government to interro-
gate the South on its laws, policies and institutions.120 Southern represent-
atives refused to allow petitioners to compel a moral debate on the subject
of slavery.1"1 "Such a contest is beyond mortal endurance," Calhoun ar-
gued, "[w]e must in the end be humbled, degraded, broken down, and
116. 2 THE WORKS OF JOHN C. CALHOUN, 487, 480 (j. Cralle ed. 1853) (referring to U.S.
Constitution, art. 1, § 5, cl. 2) [hereinafter WORKS OF CALHOUN, cited by volume]; see also Letter
from Honorable H. Otis to J. Whipple, Esq., Rhode Island State Legislature (Jan. 23, 1839), and
Reply (March 1, 1839), reprinted in R.I. REmS. 5-7 (petitioning is "a right to individual action, and
not a right to control legislative action"); id. at 22 (fear that "every vaguery" will command legislative
time) (available in Library of Congress: E449.R46) [hereinafter R.I. REPS.].
117. 2 WORKS OF CALHOUN 481; see also The Right of Petition, Remarks in the Senate on
Various Petitions and Other Matters Connected with the Subject of Slavery 14 (Feb. 12, 1850) (Con-
gressional processes "appropriated by mischievous incendiaries") (available on microfilm in Library of
Congress); Speech of Mr. Rayner, of North Carolina, on the Question of the Reception of Abolition
Petitions. Delivered in the House of Representatives 5 (June 15, 1841) ("the inherent and necessary
right of every legislative body to protect itself. . . in the exercise of its legal functions") (available in
Library of Congress) [hereinafter Address by Congressman Rayner].
118. See 2 WORKS OF CALHOUN 467, 469. Though consistent with recent case law, see supra
note 2, this bifurcation runs counter to colonial practice, where petitioning in fact did turn citizens
into lawmakers.
119. R.I. REPS., supra note 116, at 5 (petitions part of proceedings, "to be regulated solely and
exclusively by the House").
120. See, e.g., S. JOURNAL, 25th Cong., 2d Sess. 83 (1837); REPs. OF CoMMs. No. 404, 28th
Cong., Ist Sess. 35 (1844) ("there is no right to employ the government as an instrument of dangerous
agitation"); Speech by William Cost Johnson, of Maryland, on the Subject of the Rejection of Peti-
tions for the Abolition of Slavery; with Supplemental Remarks. Delivered in the House of Represent-
atives 11-13 (Jan. 25, 27, 28, 1840) (available in Library of Congress) [hereinafter Address by Con-
gressman Johnson]. Petitioning in colonial America performed precisely this inquisitorial function.
Colonists prayed to assemblies to investigate and redress their grievances, and wrongdoers had no
privilege to be "left alone."
121. See Commonwealth v. Barrett, 36 Va. (9 Leigh) 665 (1839). Lysander Barrett and ten
others were charged with violation of a Virginia act "to suppress the circulation of incendiary publica-
tions." Id. Barrett's paper was an anti-slavery petition to Congress and is reprinted in I JUDICIAL
CASES CONCERNING AMERICAN SLAVERY AND THE NEGRO 195-96 (H. Catterall rev. ed. 1968); see
also 2 WORKS OF CALHOUN 490 ("We cannot remain here in an endless struggle in defence of our
character, our property, and institutions.").
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worn out."' 122 Charging that abolitionists' petitions were designed for agi-
tation and not for genuine redress of grievances, 123 Southern members
stressed the preservation of states' rights. Abolitionists could have no voice
in the design of Southern institutions. "The discussion, on our part," ex-
claimed Congressman Rayner of North Carolina, "is of a defensive char-
acter-we want no discussion-we call for no action-but we simply ask
to be let alone."1
24
Southerners accused anti-slavery petitioners of guising libel and sedition
as free discussion. 25 They were adamant that petitioners could seek only
redress of grievances that were felt and manifest; no petitioner was enti-
tled to initiate legislation which would leave her or him unaffected.1 26
Petitioners' anti-slavery agitation was decried as unlawful. First, the
original compromises necessary to draft the Constitution, such as basing
representation on the slave population, were said to estop challenges to
slavery.1 27 Second, abolitionists' petitions were blamed for inflaming secta-
rian controversies, arousing prejudices, and fostering disunion. This libel
and illegality suspended the normal privilege of consideration.1 21 In the
words of one Congressman: "I maintain that slavery having pre-
existed-having been recognized, adopted, and guarantied by the constitu-
tion-no afterthought of fanaticism or pretended humanity can, for spe-
cious purposes, seize upon the property of any citizen .... 1,,a29
Southern demands for nonintervention coalesced in a jurisdictional ar-
122. 2 WORKS OF CALHOUN 483. The South's slavery posture was one of silence. Calhoun was
adamant that "[tihe most unquestionable right [Southern slavery] may be rendered doubtful, if once
admitted to be a subject of controversy .... " J. CALHOUN, SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN 223
(1843).
123. See, e.g., C. COLTON, ABOLITION A SEDITION: BY A NORTHERN MAN, CALVIN COLTON
16-17, 53-54 (1839) (American Anti-Slavery Society agitating against Constitution); R.I. REPS.,
supra note 116, at 8 (petitions "an attempt to add political heat to abolition fury").
124. Address by Congressman Rayner, supra note 117, at 13.
125. See, e.g., S. Doc. No. 249, 24th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1836) ("under the miserably perverted
name of free discussion, these incendiaries will be permitted to scatter their firebrands throughout the
country").
126. See, e.g., H. JOURNAL, 25th Cong., 3d Sess. 168 (1838) (slavery not a grievance to
Southerners).
127. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 691, 24th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1836); H. JOURNAL, 24th Cong., 1st
Sess. 148 (1836); S. Misc. Doe. No. 110, 31st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1850) (slavery, protected by Con-
stitution, may be modified by states only).
128. See, e.g., S. Doe. No. 75, 24th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1837) (protesting "monstrous encroach-
ment" of abolitionists, whose libelous petitions violated the constitutional aim of "domestic tranquil-
ity"); H. JOURNAL, 25th Cong., 3d Sess. 277-78 (1839); S. MIsc. Doe. No. 48, 30th Cong., 2d Sess.
2 (1849) (petitions for law abolishing slavery in District of Columbia "a direct attack upon the insti-
tutions of the southern States").
129. Address by Congressman Johnson, supra note 120, at 23; see also H. JOURNAL, 26th Cong.,
1st Sess. 144 (1839). "Gag" proponents alleged a blatant contradiction between emanicipation peti-
tions and the constitutional guarantee of property. See, e.g., 3 WORKS OF CALHOUN 443 ("Is it not a
direct infraction, then, of the Constitution, to present petitions here, in the common council of the
Union, and to us, the agents appointed to carry its provisions into effect, and to guard the rights it
secures, the professed aim of which is to destroy the property guaranteed by the instrument?").
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gument against petitioners' right to hearing. Denying Congress' constitu-
tional authority to abolish slavery, Calhoun concluded that individuals
seeking abolition had no just right to petition the legislature. His states'
rights and nullification doctrines 30 described a federal government of
strictly limited powers whose constitutive charter recognized slavery and
conceded its control to states. Reasoning from the alleged constitutional
immunity of slavery, members opposed recognition of abolitionists' peti-
tions. 1 3  The contest centered on reception; once petitions were admitted
and jurisdiction conceded, further protest could attack only the substance
of petitions and not the extension of federal authority over slavery.132
But improper jurisdiction itself was unclear. Abolitionists prudently
narrowed their target to slavery in the nation's capital.1 3 Whereas
Southerners saw the strategy bridging to a campaign against the South, in
fact the restraint undermined the pro-slavery opposition to Congressional
overreaching. Though most representatives acknowledged the states' abso-
lute authority to legislate with respect to slavery, lawmaking for the Dis-
trict of Columbia was altogether different.1 4 Express constitutional lan-
guage vested Congress with lawmaking power over the capital.135 Pro-
slavery advocates retorted that the duties of Congress towards the capital
must parallel those of a local legislature, attentive only to its inhabi-
tants.13" Moreover, Virginia and Maryland claimed that their cession of
lands to the District included an implicit guarantee that property (slaves)
would remain inviolate.137
130. See 2 H. VON HOLST, supra note 111, at 272.
131. See, e.g., S. Doc. No. 81, 24th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1836); Address by Congressman John-
son, supra note 120, at 5, 29, 34 ("We cannot of right be petitioned to do that which we have no
constitutional power to do, much less that which we have sworn not to do."). Northern antagonism to
slavery, "gag" proponents argued, was an attempt through petitions to costume their true design to
aggrandize power in the national government against Southern interests. See 2 A. STEPHENS, CONSTI-
TUTIONAL VIEW OF THE LATE WAR BETWEEN THE STATES: ITS CAUSES, CHARACTER, CONDUCT,
AND RESULTS 28-29 (reprint 1970).
132. Tremain, Slavery in the District of Columbia, 1-2 NEB. U. SEMINARY PAPERS 87-88
(1981-82) (quoting Congressman Wise's remarks that if a "gag" still allows reception of anti-slavery
petitions "the whole ground is gone and the abolitionists have triumphed, because. . . if you have the
power to report at all, you may report favorably as well as unfavorably").
Again, this Southern position contradicted the original meaning of the petition right, for in colonial
America citizens petitioned assemblies for relief precisely when existing law offered no answer. The
assemblies, in turn, encouraged petitions which might extend their jurisdiction.
133. See, e.g., H. JOURNAL, 24th Cong., 1st Sess. 193-97, 539 (1836).
134. See generally Tremain, supra note 132 (general discussion of slavery in the capital); see also
Speech of Mr. Severance, of Maine, on the Right of Petition. Delivered in the House of Representa-
tives 3 (Feb. 16, 1844) (jurisdiction of Congress over capital warrants anti-slavery petitions) (available
in Library of Congress) [hereinafter Address by Congressman Severance].
135. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
136. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 60, 20th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1829) (committee report that citizens of
states not qualified to petition on local matters in capital); S. Doc. No. 75, 24th Cong., 2d Sess. 2
(1837) (petitioners obtrude in domestic affairs of District, where Congress must act as "local
legislature").
137. H.R. Doc. No. 152, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1842); see also Tremain, supra note 132, at
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B. The Northern Anti-Slavery Position
The leading spokesman in Congress for the anti-slavery petitioners was
John Quincy Adams. Though sympathetic to the anti-slavery cause, Ad-
ams regarded abolitionist petitioning as politically ill-advised."' 8 Nonethe-
less, he thought himself obliged to present the papers.139 Congress had to
protect the citizenry's two constitutional means of approaching the govern-
ment: periodic election and continual instruction through petitioning.140
Defending the right of every person to petition Congress, whatever the
motive, Adams declared that each petition was entitled to a hearing on its
merits.141
Participation by ballot and petition not only assured popular control of
government, but also attached to each citizen responsibility for the nation's
laws, or lack thereof.14 2 Slavery, above all slavery in the nation's capital,
was an affront to the national conscience. Petitions, because they entailed
personal commitment and resolve,143 were encouraged as means by which
citizens could disassociate themselves from the evils of slavery. William
Channing, a leading abolitionist, proclaimed: "The District of Columbia
fastens on the whole nation the guilt of slaveholding . . . .And I hold it
the duty of every man in the free States . . .by solemn remonstrance to
Congress, to purge his conscience of the nation's crime.11 44
Abolitionists also argued that slavery caused direct grievance because it
intruded on national affairs, threatened domestic tranquility, and ob-
structed interstate relations. 145 Such injuries, they claimed, warranted the
69; Address by Congressman Johnson, supra note 120, at 53 ("Two hundred and fifty members [of
Congress] were never intended to be set over the people of this District as absolute masters, tyrants,
disposers of the rights of property . . ").
138. See S. BEMIS, JOHN QUINcY ADAMS AND THE UNION 380 (1956) ("I wish distinctly to aver
...that though I have earnestly advocated the right of persons to petition for the abolition of slavery
in the District of Columbia, I myself am not prepared to grant their prayer.").
139. Id.
140. See, e.g., 1 THE ANTI-SLAVERY EXAMINER 3 (Aug. 1836) (petitioning essential to informed
voting and legislation).
141. See J. Q. Adams, List of Petitions, National Intelligencer, Apr. 23, 1839, at 2, col. 4; Speech
of Mr. Cushing, of Massachusetts, on the Right of Petition, as Connected with Petitions for the
Abolition of Slavery and the Slave Trade in the District of Columbia in the House of Representatives
11 (Jan. 25, 1836) (every citizen's right to be heard on floor of House essential to democracy) (availa-
ble in Library of Congress) [hereinafter Address by Congressman Cushing].
142. See, e.g., The National Era, Jan. 18, 1849, at 10, col. 2 (concerning petitioning against
slavery, "those who elect the law-makers are responsible for the laws made, or for the neglect to pass
laws which ought to be enacted").
143. See, e.g., W. WIEcEK, supra note 106, at 184. But see H. Thoreau, Resistance to Civil
Government, reprinted in 1 AMERICAN ISSUES 494, 496 (W. Thorp, M. Curti & C. Baker eds. 1944)
(persons opposed to slavery do little, "[t]hey hesitate, and they regret, and sometimes they petition; but
they do nothing in earnest and with effect").
144. W. CHANNING, REMARKS ON THE SLAVERY QUESTION, IN A LE-rER TO JONATHAN
PHILLIPS, ESQ. 15, 17 (1839).
145. For example, interstate relations were impeded by Southern mail regulations, which were
designed to intercept abolitionist mailings. W. SAVAGE, THE CONTROVERY OVER THE DISTRIBUTIoN
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petitioning by free states for legislative change. 146 And even if Northern
interests were less evident, the First Amendment protection of petitioning
was said to be absolute. No personal, social or moral conditions could be
imposed on the exercise of the right.147
Abolitionists warned that a "gag" against anti-slavery petitions might,
with equal facility, silence other matters of public concern.' 48 They feared
that one branch of Congress could by itself limit the scope of constitu-
tional protection by summarily denying citizens the right of prayer."49
Barring consideration of a class of petitions was criticized as an arbitrary
act, akin to a judicial decision pronounced in advance of the facts.' 50 Ad-
ams and others declared that minority political expression would be si-
lenced if petitioning were confined only to those subjects approved by a
majority in Congress.' 5' At bottom, the "gag" opponents insisted that the
right to petition implied duties to hear, consider, debate, and decide. 152
Even if want of authority required the ultimate denial of a petition, the
preliminary rights of communication and consideration ought not to be
infringed. 15  This logic took vivid illustration in the controversy over Ad-
ams's introduction of a petition from Haverhill, Massachusetts, requesting
OF ABOLITION LITERATURE, 1830-1860 (1938).
146. Address by Congressman Severance, supra note 134, at 14.
147. See, e.g., Address by William Jay to the Friends of Constitutional Liberty on the Violation
by the United States House of Representatives of the Right of Petition (Feb. 13, 1840), in W. JAY,
MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS ON SLAVERY 397, 401-02 (1853) (charges that people denied access to
representatives on any matter are "gagged") [hereinafter Address by William Jay]; H. JOURNAL,
26th Cong., 1st Sess. 788 (1840) (Massachusetts resolution affirming Congress' duty to give all peti-
tioners "respectful and deliberate consideration," "however mistaken in their views, or insignificant in
number").
148. See Address by William Jay, supra note 147, at 402.
149. See, e.g., The Right of Petition, Remarks in Senate, supra note 117, at 7, 9; Letter from
John Quincy Adams to the Twelfth Congressional District of Massachusetts (Mar. 3, 1837), in J. Q.
ADAMS, LETTERS FROM JOHN QUINCY ADAMS TO HIS CONSTITUENTS OF THE TWELFTH CONGRES-
SIONAL DIsmIcT IN MASSACHUSETTS. To WHICH Is ADDED HIS SPEECH IN CONGRESS, DELIV-
ERED FEB. 9, 1837, at 5, 40 (1837) ("gag" law violates principle that House is not competent to
define Constitutional rights) (available in Library of Congress).
150. Adams charged that the right to petition had been impeached when a petition for Mexican
arbitration concerning Texas, which had been sent to committee for report, was later discovered to
have been put with all anti-Texas petitions and ignored. See S. BEMIS, supra note 138, at 363-369.
151. See, e.g., The National Era, Jan. 18, 1849, at 10, col. 1 ("gross evasion" of democratic
system where petition reception depended on consent of majority); Address of John Quincy Adams on
the Resolutions To Censure Him for Inquiring of the Speaker, Whether a Paper Purporting To Be
from Slaves, Came Within the Order of the House, Which Laid on the Table All Petitions Relating
to Slavery, in J.Q. ADAMS, supra note 149, at 45, 52 ("gag" rule would "reduce the right of petition
to nothing more than the right of the predominant party, for the time being, to petition").
152. See, e.g., S. JOURNAL, 25th Cong., 2d Sess. 136-37 (1838) (Senate motions interpreting the
right of petition "to include the duty . . . to receive and determine upon the prayer of the
petitioners").
153. See, e.g., The National Era, Jan. 18, 1849, at 10, col. 2 ("The want of power is a good
reason for not granting the prayer of a petition, but no reason for refusing to receive the petition
itself."); J. Q. Adams, List of Petitions, National Intelligencer, Apr. 23, 1839, at 2, col. 4 (distin-
guishing between implied rights of reception and hearing and Congress' discretion to reject prayer on
merits).
The Yale Law Journal
dissolution of the Union. Members moved to censure Adams on the
grounds that the right of petition could not extend to destruction of the
sovereign power petitioned. Adams, while admitting that Congress could
not take such action, denied that the unavailability of the requested rem-
edy should preclude the processes of petition and hearing. Recalling the
events of 1776 and "'the right of the people to alter, to change, to destroy,
the Government if it becomes oppressive to them,' " Adams concluded, "'I
rest that petition on the Declaration of Independence.' "1
Northerners warned that no government should assume that it could
not reason with its citizens. Hence, for Haverhill townspeople and aboli-
tionists alike, Adams' response was: "'I say that if the petition is referred
and answered, it will satisfy the petitioners.' ""5 Together with a faith in
democracy came disdain for the belief that anti-slavery opinion could be
silenced. One state communication to Congress described the "gag" as an
"unphilosophical and absurd mode to stop the progress of reform, or the
spread of fanaticism."'"
8
Adams, like Calhoun, sought to differentiate petition from assembly
powers. Yet, whereas the representatives of the slave-holding states found
balance in a presentation-reception distinction, Adams gave more author-
ity to citizens. Citizens had the liberty, even the responsibility, to petition
on any matter, irrespectively of the legislature's power of redress. Since
both offer and consideration were indispensable to effective petitioning,
the correct line lay between the guarantee of those two rights and the
assembly discretion to deny or disapprove a particular petitioner's request.
The right to petition carried a mandate of hearing, but not of approval.
Finally, abolitionists protested that the "gag rules" not only subverted
popular self-government, but also nullified members' freedom of speech
and proposal.157 A rule proscribing introduction of certain matters as of-
fenses against the House, Southern States, or the Union, choked debate.
Lawmaking subject to majority caprice, with the extent of encroachment
varying with each "gag" resolution, was said to make a mockery of the
speech and debate privilege of representatives. Accordingly, when the
House clamored to censure Adams for acting on a petition from slaves, the
New Englander's reply was acerbic: "The whole doctrine of contempts
154. S. BEMIs, supra note 139, at 427-31. Congressman Cushing also came to the defense of the
Haverhill petitioners and stated that any person has a right to be heard, "be he fanatic or be he
philosopher." Address by Congressman Cushing, supra note 142, at 3.
155. S. BEMiS, supra note 138, at 431.
156. H. JOURNAL, 26th Cong., 1st Sess. 788 (1840).
157. See, e.g., H. JOURNAL, 25th Cong., 2d Sess. 347 (1838); Letter from John Quincy Adams to
the Twelfth Congressional District of Massachusetts (Mar. 3, 1837), in J.Q. ADAMS, supra note 149,
at 29; REPS. OF COMMS. No. 404, 28th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1844) ("['Gag'] is a perpetual denial to
the House of the power to deliberate on the means of ameliorating the condition of the people
.. ." .
Vol. 96: 142, 1986
Right to Petition
. . . is a law of tyranny, in which the House is at once acuser, party,
judge, and executioner."15
V. CONCLUSION
The controversy over the right to petition, which involved diametrically
opposed congressional interpretations of the First Amendment, highlights
the elasticity of constitutional language. The essence of the dispute cen-
tered on whether the petition clause supplied merely a "presentative"
right-the individual's right to voice grievances to Congress-or whether
it went further to dictate a procedure for disposal, with an unqualified
requirement that Congress receive and consider petitions. Despite the
clear colonial practice that linked petitioning to a corollary duty of legisla-
tive response, the Southern "gag" proponents successfully challenged this
link and subsumed the right within free expression. The abrupt defeat of
a right so indispensable to the colonial legislative process has two explana-
tions: first, the frailty of the right of petition, a right uprooted from the
social and political context in which its use had flourished, and second,
more broadly, the assailability of any principle, however fundamental,
when confronted by interests as entrenched as slavery. Transport a right
from an altogether different political culture into a period of intense polit-
ical antagonisms, and constitutional language and purpose are readily
subverted. The right to petition was ill-fitted to lawmaking in the national
legislature; but, perhaps more decisively, it had the misfortune to become
inextricably entangled in the slavery crisis.
To explore the consequences of reinstituting the colonial process of law-
making and representation through popular petitions would be to reargue
the Federalist-Antifederalist debate, in a twentieth century context. That
is too ambitious.159 Holding to historical argument nonetheless suggests an
158. Letter from John Quincy Adams to the Twelfth Congressional District of Massachusetts
(Mar. 3, 1837), in J.Q. ADAMS, supra note 149, at 21.
159. One might, however, recognize petitioning as a constitutionally mandated feature of the law-
making process. Like such procedural requirements as majority, bicameral enactment, and indepen-
dent executive assent, the petition clause may add a dimension to legislative accountability by making
lawmaking more adjudicative, with deliberations open to petitioners' voices. Cf. Linde, Due Process of
Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197, 235-55 (1976) (due process application to process of lawmaking
would incorporate Bill of Rights procedures). This authority of persons, as before courts, see Fiss, The
Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 13 (1979)
(judges do not control agendas; rather, they must listen and respond to grievants), to command a
public hearing before lawmakers, has constitutional analogy in article 1, section 5's empowerment of a
minority of either House to force a public, recorded vote on "any question." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5,
cl. 3. Interview with Akhil Amar, Assisitant Professor of Law, Yale Law School (Aug. 10, 1986).
Specific lessons could be taken from colonial America, where it has been shown that assemblies' treat-
ment of petitions involved processes of fair notice and hearing. The modern state does attach a right of
petition hearing to some executive and administrative bodies' proceedings. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 553(c)
(1982) (agency rulemaking). This view identifies petitioning with the legislative process, as an indis-
pensable complement to suffrage: by the latter citizens elect their government, and by the former they
165
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important lesson. The historian may chide legal scholars and judges alike
who, while protesting fidelity to the Framers' intent, have in fact acqui-
esced in the evisceration of the original meaning of the right to petition, a
right which had compelled legislatures to accord citizens' petitions fair
hearing and consideration.
Legal scholarship must be honest. If courts continue to confine the First
Amendment petition guarantee to presentation, or free expression as in
McDonald' and Minnesota State Board,6' they should be candid about
the inconsistency with the Framers' intent. To be sure, rights and methods
of lawmaking may be bound to historical eras. The original character of
the right to petition may impose an untenable restraint on the autonomy
and agenda setting power of the federal legislature. But until this conclu-
sion is made, court opinions will appear to rest not on the Framers' in-
tent, but on deference to the resolve of antebellum Congresses to defeat a
right which threatened the institution of slavery.
continually inform it of their will. A reassertion in the legislative sphere of this procedural require-
ment of consideration might check legislative irresponsibility, especially the ills of ignorance, arbitrari-
ness, and majoritarian insensitivity.
160. McDonald v. U.S., 105 S. Ct. 2787 (1985); see supra note 2.
161. Minnesota State Bd. for Community Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 217, 283 ("The Constitu-
tion does not grant to members of the public generally a right to be heard by public bodies making
decisions of policy.").
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